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S. Toner on Gelphi, Feaver and
Reifler’s Paying the Human Costs of
War
1 Christopher Gelphi,  Peter  D.  Feaver and Jason Reifler.  Paying  the  Human Costs  of  War:
American Public Opinion & Casualties in Military Conflicts. New Haven: Princeton University
Press, 2009. 280 pp. ISBN 978-0691139081
2 In one of their less astute observations the authors of Paying the Human Costs of War
suggest ‘that the United States does not go to war often’  (67).  While war and public
opinion  is  a  notoriously  difficult  subject  to  study,  few  countries  offer  as  great  an
opportunity to study the topic as the United States. Despite their dismay at the apparent
paucity of foreign military engagements to examine, Christopher Gelphi, Peter Feaver
and Jason Reifler have made an interesting and sometimes controversial contribution to
the literature on military casualties and public opinion. In examining the way in which
the US public structures its attitudes toward war and military casualties, they found that
it was the interactive effect of prospective judgements about the likelihood of a mission
succeeding and retrospective judgements about the initial rightness of the war that led
Americans to continue supporting a mission in the face of mounting casualties (20). Of
these  two,  however,  expectations  of  success  is  the  most  important  factor  affecting
casualty tolerance. 
3 The book grew out of the Duke University project ‘Wielding American Power’ and seeks to
probe the extent of the US public’s casualty tolerance. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the
Duke project’s title,  the authors are interested in uncovering the factors that lead to
continued  public  support  for  some  wars  despite  substantial  casualties.  Rather  than
viewing public opinion as a welcome limitation on risky American military adventures,
they often treat it as something that can be shaped and manipulated. Gelphi and Feaver
presented the findings of  their opinion polls  to the Bush administration in 2004 and
although they also consulted with the Kerry campaign team, Feaver’s media contributions
leave little doubt as to his political inclinations.1 Feaver subsequently went to work at the
National Security Council from 2005- 2008 and it certainly seems that his research fed
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into the presidential rhetoric of the time, particularly the desire to frame the war in Iraq
as heading toward victory.2
4 In his landmark works on war and US public opinion John Mueller of the Ohio State
University came to the conclusion that there existed a ‘simple association: as casualties
mount, support decreases’.3 Mueller is Gelphi, Feaver and Reifler’s intellectual bête noire.
For  these  authors  ‘the  image of  the  American public  as  a  paper  tiger  -  a  mirage of
strength that collapses in the face of casualties- is as incorrect as it is popular’ (2). They
argue that US policymakers are not as constrained by public opinion as the conventional
wisdom would hold. 
5 The  authors  argue  that  the  public  is  capable  of  structuring  its  attitude  to  foreign
engagements in a coherent manner and engages in a rational cost-benefit analysis when
lending  its  support  to  a  mission.  Gelphi  et  al.  reject  Mueller’s  ‘inexorable  decline’
argument by examining support for American wars at times of both battlefield success
and battlefield defeat.  They claim that US citizens have a much greater tolerance for
casualties at times of demonstrable success and they offer some convincing examples
from wars past and present. 
6 Building  on  the  literature,  the  authors  suggest  that  while  the  mission  type,  elite
consensus and multilateral  support  increase casualty tolerance,  none of  these has so
great an impact as expectations of success (122-123). What the authors never quite pin
down is the degree to which these factors feed into perceptions of success, something
that they treat as an independent rather than the sum total of several factors.
7 The strength of the work lies in the authors’ ability to carry out surveys during a major
war, from September 2003 to November 2004. Most studies in the area of war and public
opinion rely exclusively on posing hypothetical questions to survey respondents whereas
Gelphi et al. conducted their surveys in response to real world events. There is also no
doubt about the quality of the statistical analysis to which the authors submit their data,
although the statistics often make for some impenetrable reading. They also examine
their data at the individual level, in contrast to most studies in this area that examine
aggregate data. As such they are able unpack some of the causes of support and offer
some insights on the demographics and individual motivations of casualty tolerance. 
8 Nonetheless, the work is found wanting in several critical areas. Firstly, ‘expectations of
success’ is an abstract concept at best. The authors offer a section on what success in Iraq
means to the US public and they highlight that the public is responsive to the way in
which the administration frames victory. One might suggest that most Americans rely on
the administration for definitions of success, however accurate those definitions may be.
Gelphi et al.  are convinced that presidential rhetoric can shape public perceptions of
success but their own work shows that this only causes short term spikes after which
support declines once it becomes obvious that success on the ground is not sustained.
9 The primary weakness of the material on the Iraq war, the bulk of the study, is that the
surveys were carried out between September 2003 and November 2004 prior to the most
deadly phase of the insurgency. No reason is offered for this even though the book did
not go to press until the fall of 2008. Conveniently enough for the authors, the problems
raised by conducting surveys during only the first year of the war can be ignored because
not once is the length of a conflict considered as a factor which affects the robustness of
support. 
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10 The authors also undermine their own position by highlighting, after 200 pages in which
they have repeatedly argued that the public has a reasonable and reasoned grasp on
issues of foreign policy, that only 48 percent of respondents to one of their 2004 surveys
could identify Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. Other figures are alarming, such
as the 16 percent of respondents to one survey who suggested that they would tolerate up
to 50,000 US deaths in Iraq. Such figures make a mockery of the ‘pretty prudent public’
argument.
11 The authors ignore the huge changes that have occurred in the way that America wages
war in the past 20 years. It is difficult to quantify whether the US public as a whole has
made sense of the shift from ‘revolution in military affairs’-style conflicts like Kosovo in
1999  to  counterinsurgency  operations  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  What  has  been  the
psychological impact of the switch from the ‘virtual wars’ of the Clinton years to the
population-centric ‘COIN’ approach of the ‘War on Terror’ and the attendant increase in
casualties? It would have been interesting if the authors had examined this.
12 Perhaps most depressingly of all is the absence of any consideration of civilian casualties.
The authors suggest that this is an important area for future research but one would have
thought that the horrific internecine violence unleashed in Iraq by the US invasion would
have had so considerable an impact on support for the war that it would have to be
included in any survey.
Simon Toner, University College Dublin
NOTES
1. See for example Feaver’s contributions to Foreign Policy’s ‘Shadow
Government’ blog, www.foreignpolicy.com
2. ‘Bush's Speech on Iraq War Echoes Voice of an Analyst’, New York Times, December 4,
2005.
3. John Mueller, ‘The Iraq Syndrome’, Foreign Affairs, November/December
2005
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